Recent Transitions in Natural
Theology:
The Emergence of a Bolder
Paradigm
Hugh G. Gauch, Jr.
Crop
and Soil Sciences
Cornell
University
Ithaca,
New York 14853-1901
hgg1@cornell.edu
June 2006
Natural theology pursues knowledge of God based on public evidence accessible to all persons by virtue of our shared human endowments of reason and sense perception. For millennia, natural theology has supported merely generic theism. However, five new projects in natural theology are more ambitious, pursuing distinctively Christian theism. They concern church witness, Bible prophecy, Bible narrative, Trinitarian metaphysics, and Christ's resurrection. These projects can be combined in a strong cumulative case, although it is also important to have individual projects that singly carry great evidential weight. The case for reported miracles, which are so essential in the Biblical worldview, is strategically strengthened by empirical evidence for testable miracles. Several open questions are discussed that merit further exploration. A bolder natural theology has important implications for Christian apologetics. The most pressing motivation for developing an enriched natural theology is to provide better support for Christian revealed theology. |
EDITOR'S NOTE
Although the author is in agreement with the doctrinal statement of IBRI, it does not follow that all of the viewpoints espoused in this paper represent official positions of IBRI. Since one of the purposes of the IBRI report series is to serve as a preprint forum, it is possible that the author has revised some aspects of this work since it was first written. |
Recent Transitions in Natural
Theology:
The Emergence of a Bolder
Paradigm
Hugh G.
Gauch, Jr.
Outline
Introduction
Definitions
of Natural Theology
Projects
in Christian Natural Theology
Church
Witness
Bible
Prophecy
Bible
Narrative
Trinitarian
Metaphysics
Christ's
Resurrection
Comprehensive
Worldviews and Cumulative Cases
In-principle
and Empirical Verdicts on Miracles
Testimonial
Evidence
Dwindling
Probabilities
Scientific
Naturalism
Open
Questions
Implications
for Apologetics
Conclusions
Unless
it seems very evident to the reader of the Gospels or the hearer of a
sermon
that those great things are true, we need reasons to believe them,
despite the
powerful objections by modern critics to the historicity of the
Gospels, and
the fact that there are other religions with rival messages which seem
equally
evident to their adherents.
--
Richard Swinburne[i]
Introduction
The
recent literature in natural theology frames three watershed issues
that go to
the very heart of natural theology's strategies and prospects. One is whether it is harder for natural
theology to offer strong arguments for distinctively Christian theism than for merely generic theism.
Another is the structure and
formulation of a cumulative case.
The third issue is the proper roles of philosophical reasoning
and
empirical investigation in the case for miracles.
This
recent literature frames these issues cogently and makes considerable
progress. However, these new
developments in natural theology are easily overlooked because they
involve
such diverse arguments published in such scattered places.
Accordingly, this paper collects these
scattered developments in one place in order to sketch the big picture. It also identifies several open
questions meriting further development.
Seeing both what has already been done and what yet remains can
help to
accelerate the emergence of an ambitious and bold paradigm.
Definitions of Natural
Theology
The
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy entry on "theologia
naturalis" by A.P.
Martinich begins by
saying that natural theology is "theology that uses the methods
of
investigation and standards of rationality of any other area of
philosophy," as
contrasted with supernatural or revealed theology.[ii] The Oxford
Dictionary of Philosophy
entry on "natural theology"
by Simon Blackburn begins with "Doctrines concerning God that
are attainable by
natural processes of reasoning, as opposed to those that require the
assistance
of revelation."[iii] And the Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
article on "natural theology"
by Scott MacDonald begins with "Natural theology aims at
establishing truths or
acquiring knowledge about God (or divine matters generally) using only
our
natural cognitive resources," as contrasted with revealed
theology.[iv] He further
explains that "The phrase 'our natural cognitive
resources' identifies both the methods and data for natural
theology: it relies on standard techniques
of
reasoning and facts or truths in principle available to all human
beings just
in virtue of their possessing reason and sense perception."
Natural
theology applies public methods to public data in order to deliver
public
knowledge of God.[v] Natural science
and natural theology alike rely on reasoning
and facts available to all human beings with their endowments of reason
and
sense perception, that is, they both rely on empirical and public
evidence. Natural science seeks empirical
evidence that bears on scientific hypotheses, whereas natural theology
seeks
empirical evidence that bears on worldview hypotheses.
The
following consensus definition has been collated from the above
definitions.[vi]
Traditional
Definition: Natural
theology is knowledge of God,
based
on reason rather than revelation.
Unfortunately,
this definition gives natural theology an unclear boundary. It combines a positive stipulation
(reason) and a negative stipulation (no revelation).
But it ignores the simple and crucial distinction that a
revelation may have some content that is, and some content that is not,
empirically verifiable and hence within reason's purview.
What if some revelation includes
evidence for God's existence that involves testable facts about
physical things
open to public examination, so the first stipulation is met but not the
second? Would this definition
include or exclude such evidence?
Well,
a dogged, literal interpretation might exclude such evidence since the
second
stipulation is unmet. But one
might plausibly think that what natural theology rightly foregoes from
revealed
theology is presupposed authority, not empirical evidence.
Hence, wholesale dismissal of
revelation as a potential source of theistic evidence might needlessly
shrink
and weaken natural theology. In
any case, greater clarity is needed.
Consequently,
a better definition is sought. The
following clarified definition emphasizes the intended public
accessibility of
natural theology.
Clarified
Definition:
Natural theology is public knowledge of
God,
accessible
to all persons by virtue of their reason and sense perception.
The
strategic advantage to be gained from this clarified definition is that
it
expands natural theology's boundary to examine any empirical and
public
evidence with worldview import, whatever the source, including the
natural
world and testable revelations.
This adds new arguments, but removes no old ones.
More data means more potential for big
conclusions. Furthermore, as
documented in the next section, current practice in natural theology
has
already outgrown the traditional definition, so only the clarified
definition
is accurate now.
The
importance of this expansion can be highlighted by recalling the
typical,
meager deliverances of traditional natural theology.
Traditional arguments deliver a quite limited view of God,
even if presumed successful. For
instance, the venerable cosmological argument concludes that "some
being
independent of the physical universe exists that brought that universe
into
being," but it does not show that this being is "a
perfectly good being, or
interested in human affairs, or worthy of worship."[vii] To show
God's nature as fully as possible, natural
theologians combine many diverse arguments in a cumulative case. The findings from a rather energetic
rendition of natural theology are that God is "a person without
a body (i.e. a
spirit) who is eternal, is perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly
good, and the creator of all things."[viii] But
regrettably, conspicuously absent from even this
exceptionally ambitious and optimistic version of generic theism are
important
Christian beliefs such as that God is involved in human history, raised
Christ
from the dead, and is worthy of worship.
A growing number of contemporary natural theologians are not
satisfied
with this meager version of theism.
Projects in Christian
Natural Theology
Five
recent projects in natural theology are reviewed in this section that
are
diverse in the evidence they consider but unified in the goal they
pursue. They are all projects in
distinctively
Christian theism. The first
example emerged in 2001, the second in 2002, and the others in 2003.
As
might be expected, all of these arguments have ancient roots in
Christian
apologetics, revealed theology, or most generally, Christian witness. What are new, however, are the old
arguments that have been adequately reformulated and explicitly
identified as
exercises in natural theology, meeting the strict requirement for
public
accessibility.
Church
Witness.
First, consider the recent Gifford
lectures on church witness by Stanley Hauerwas in 2001 at St. Andrews. He issued a vigorous call for natural
theologians to deliver more. The "heart of
the argument" that Hauerwas developed in his
lectures "is that
natural theology divorced from a full doctrine of God cannot help but
distort
the character of God and, accordingly, of the world in which we find
ourselves. The metaphysical and
existential projects to make a 'place' for such a god
cannot help but 'prove'
the existence of a god that is not worthy of worship.
The Trinity is not a further specification of a more
determinative reality called god, because there is no more
determinative
reality than the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. ... I must
maintain that the God who moves the sun and the stars is the same God
who was
incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth."[ix]
What
Hauerwas holds forth for the world to consider is the witness of the
Christian
church, especially the church's understanding of human suffering
and
redemption. "The attempt to
develop a natural theology prior to or as grounds for subsequent claims
about
God cannot help but be mistaken to the extent such a project fails to
help us
see that there can be no deeper reality-making claim than ...
[that] those who
bear crosses work with the grain of the universe. ... In fact, the
God we worship and the world God created cannot be truthfully known
without the
cross, which is why the knowledge of God and ... the church are
interdependent. ...
Christians ... can be no more than
witnesses. And the very character
of that witness is an indication not only of who God is but of why that
which
exists, that is, God's created order, cannot avoid witnessing to
the One who is
our beginning and end" (pages 17 and 16).
Incidentally,
Hauerwas was keenly aware that his topic of church witness broke with
tradition
so radically that it might seem impolite, arrogant, and even foolish. But he simply disagreed with Lord
Gifford's conception of natural theology, as stipulated in his
will that
endowed the noted lectures on natural theology in Scotland's
four ancient
universities, beginning over a century ago. Peter
Ochs, on the back cover of Hauerwas's book, provides a
concise summary of Hauerwas's project. "Natural
theology will be the story of God's life
as it is lived,
visibly, in this world, as its meaning is disclosed to the community of
those
who inquire after it, and as its truth is displayed through its visible
effects
in transforming this world into the one it would be and will be." The visible, physical character of this
project provides the public accessibility that is essential to natural
theology
as conceived and defined in the previous section.
Bible
Prophecy.
Second, consider the recent 2002 paper
by Hugh Gauch, John Bloom, and Robert Newman on Bible prophecy, based
on the
paper that Gauch read at the Gifford conference in 2000 at Aberdeen.[x] The proposed
clarification in the definition of natural
theology -- including empirical and public evidence wherever found --
can expand
natural theology's boundary to include Bible prophecy.
But a clarified definition is not all
that is needed for this expansion because Bible prophecy is customarily
treated
in a manner that is inappropriate or inadequate for natural theology,
given its
distinctive and exacting requirement for public evidence.
Accordingly, that paper describes the
needed upgrades for framing testable and meaningful hypotheses,
identifying
admissible and relevant evidence, and reaching weighty and robust
conclusions.
The
salient features of the proposed test of Bible prophecy are that (1)
the
evidence is wholly empirical and public and (2) competing worldviews
have
different expectations for the predictive success rate that this
evidence will
show. Accurately dated ancient
parchments contain bold predictions known to predate the events
predicted. Stones and other artifacts
document the
subsequent outcomes. Also, the
antecedent improbabilities of correct predictions are quantified with
adequate
accuracy on the basis of objective logical or empirical considerations. Christian theism, following claims by
Isaiah (42:9, 43:9--12) and other prophets, expects miraculous
accuracy; whereas
atheism expects merely occasional luck, as do some variants of theism,
including deism with the view that God created the universe but that
ended his
involvement.
For
several prophecies concerning different and essentially independent
events, the
cumulative probability of all being fulfilled equals their individual
probabilities multiplied together.
Consequently, the test is extremely powerful, the weight of the
conclusion growing exponentially with the amount of data examined, so
manageable effort can achieve definitive results. This
test is impartial and objective, equally able to
confirm or disconfirm the Bible's claim of miraculously accurate
knowledge of
the future revealed to prophets by God, depending on the evidence. And the test is robust, requiring
respectable but not perfect data.
The proposed methodology is public, counting across worldviews. Bible prophecy is a testable miracle,
not merely a reported miracle, available for examination here and now: a preserved miracle.
These
authors' papers analyze a representative sample of the data,
which strongly
supports the Biblical worldview and disconfirms the naturalistic or
atheistic
worldview. The prophecies concern
God's involvement with Israel, the surrounding nations, and the
Messiah, so this
is decidedly an exercise in distinctively Christian theism.
This
test of Bible prophecy could be of interest to naturalists as well. Naturalists ordinarily take theirs to
be a meaningful worldview making some bold predictions that risk
falsification. Consequently, any
naturalist who denies
that Bible prophecy constitutes a legitimate test of naturalism must instead offer some other
valid test or else
surrender all pretensions that naturalism is a falsifiable and
scientifically respectable worldview.
So, naturalists and Christians alike have good reasons for
welcoming any
objective and powerful test of these worldviews.
Bible
Narrative.
Third, consider the recent Gifford
lectures on Bible narrative by Eleonore Stump in 2003 at Aberdeen. In this exercise in natural theology,
Bible narratives are regarded simply as texts to be considered, rather
than as
texts presumed to be inspired and true as in revealed theology.
Stump
combined analytic philosophy with Bible narratives in order to address
the
problem of evil, thereby responding to that major potential objection
to
theism. She argued, in a manner
intended to count across diverse worldviews, that within Christianity
there are
rich resources for dealing with the problem of evil.
This was done by appealing to things that are widely
regarded as being good, particularly we humans becoming fully what we
are meant
to be, as well as refining and obtaining the desires of our hearts. She then argued that our greatest good
and flourishing result from loving relationships with God and other
persons. Furthermore, reaching
this greatest good involves suffering that is ultimately purposeful and
redemptive.
Trinitarian
Metaphysics.
Fourth, consider the recent 2003 paper
by Sir John Polkinghorne on science and theology.[xi] He examined six
general features of the natural world
(including human experience and culture), such as the fine tuning of
physical
constants and several additional features of sustained interest in
natural
theology. He then compared
worldviews, using four specific criteria of metaphysical excellence, to
see how
well they can explain these features.
His
ambitious thesis is not only that theism surpasses naturalism in
explaining the
world's general features, but more specifically, Trinitarian
theism surpasses
generic theism. "I ... believe
that
what is ultimately persuasive in the case of theistic belief cannot
satisfactorily rest solely on the thin account of a kind of general
theism but
it must depend critically for its explanatory power on the detailed
insights
afforded by more specific understanding.
That is why the present discussion is unapologetic about
recourse to
trinitarian concepts." Indeed,
from his perspective, natural theology's traditional challenge
to naturalism,
which has deployed a generic theism, has given naturalism an unfair
advantage
because Christian theism could offer a stronger challenge!
Christ's
Resurrection.
Fifth and finally, consider
the recent 2003 book by Richard Swinburne on Christ's
resurrection.[xii] Interestingly,
in Swinburne's analysis, natural theology affects
the fortunes of revealed theology.
Indeed, "the probability of the existence of God ...
on the generally
accessible data of natural theology ... is crucially relevant to
whether the
historical evidence considered in this book shows that Jesus was God
Incarnate
or rose from the dead." He
calculated that the probability that Christ rose from the dead, given
traditional natural theology and careful historical inquiry, is about
97% (page
214).
Yet
far more important than this supportive role of generic or "bare"
natural
theology, the Biblical testimony to Christ's resurrection is
itself taken to be
public evidence and hence within the purview of "ramified" natural
theology. Swinburne observes that "it is
hard to read the Gospels, Acts of the Apostles, and I
Corinthians
without seeing them as claiming that various historical events (above
all, the
Resurrection) occurred and that others can know these things on the
testimony
of the apostles to have seen them."[xiii] Gary Habermas
and N.T. Wright have also emphasized the
public accessibility and great weight of the historical evidence for
the
resurrection.[xiv] For natural
theology's purposes, the Bible is read as
historical evidence rather than authoritative scripture (whereas
revealed
theology does use the latter reading).
These
five projects are representative examples of distinctively Christian
natural
theology, not a comprehensive list, because additional projects have
been and
soon will be developed.[xv] For present
purposes, however, these five examples suffice to
illustrate the unprecedented recent progression in natural theology
from
generic to Christian theism.
Comprehensive Worldviews
and Cumulative Cases
The
individual arguments used in generic natural theology are customarily
collected
and integrated in a cumulative case.
Indeed, they are often packaged in boxed sets, such as
Aquinas's
celebrated "five ways" of proving the existence of God.[xvi] But
regrettably, the arguments used in Christian natural
theology have not yet been integrated, apart from one article by
Douglas
Geivett that uses a somewhat different collection than the five
projects
reviewed here.[xvii]
The
reason for formulating natural theology as a cumulative case is often
misunderstood or trivialized. It
is commonly taken to be that each individual argument is rather weak,
so a
natural theologian is compelled to combine several weak arguments in
hopes that
their sum will be respectable, like a strong rope woven from many small
strings. But this need not be
so. Indeed, it is entirely
possible, and quite desirable, that one individual argument (or one
kind of
data) within a cumulative case provides by itself exceedingly decisive
evidence. Furthermore, the
components of a cumulative case can be complementary in senses other
than
evidential strength as such. For
instance, one of the several arguments may best capture a particular
person's
interest, given his or her training and background, so diverse
arguments may
together engage a broader audience.
Likewise, one argument may primarily bolster evidential
strength,
whereas another may clarify practical importance.
The
fundamental reason why a cumulative case emerges in natural theology is
that
the worldview-level hypotheses being compared and tested are
extraordinarily
comprehensive. God's existence, or
else nonexistence, has implications for many aspects of life. For instance, the discrepant
expectations from theism and atheism about the predictive success rate
of Bible
prophecies constitute but one difference.
Additional differences regard whether creation shows signs of a
Creator,
whether prayers are answered, whether miracles occur, whether lives are
transformed, and so on.
Consequently, the evidence for (or against) theism is most
naturally and
suitably framed as a cumulative case.
Every difference between atheism and theism that involves
publicly
observable physical things provides natural theology with one more
possibility
for testing these competing worldviews.
A
particularly exciting feature of a cumulative case is opportunities for
synergy. Lines of evidence are synergistic
if
their combined evidential weight is even greater than merely their
summed
weights. For example, if lines of
evidence are related (more technically, informationally relevant)
because of a
comprehensive theory (such as theism), then their joint evidential
weight is
greater than their individual weights simply added together.[xviii] The equation
for combining two different kinds of evidence
has three
terms: one for each kind, plus a
third term that captures a comprehensive theory's extra credit
for rendering
diverse evidence to be informationally relevant (whereas apart from
that
theory, these diverse kinds of evidence would appear to be independent
and
unrelated).
For
another example of synergy, the success of one argument may amplify
another
argument by expanding its range of admissible or respectable data,
thereby
strengthening its conclusion.
Likewise, the defeat of an atheistic presupposition by one
argument may
lower the bar for reasonable evidence expected from another argument,
thereby
making the latter more influential.
Given
that a cumulative case befits a comprehensive theory, and especially
given the
opportunities for synergy, it is imperative to better integrate
Christian
natural theology's currently rather isolated arguments.
For the sake of brevity, just several
possibilities for synergy are sketched here, admittedly in a very
preliminary
manner. All involve Bible prophecy.
Both
Hauerwas's church witness project and Stump's Bible
narrative project can be
regarded as aspects of a broader topic, religious experience, which has
been a
standard item in natural theology.[xix] But inevitably,
the evidence of religious experience is
rather soft, even if for no other reason than that adherents of
different and
incompatible religions claim positive experiences and write poignant
narratives. Therefore, arguments
from religious experience are best located within a cumulative case
with
additional arguments bearing the brunt of the evidential task. They are deeply dependent on evidence
that a particular witness is authentic.
The
church witness and Bible prophecy projects are synergistic. Fundamentally, church witness is not a
witness to its wondrous self, but rather is a witness to an invisible
and
glorious God. Accordingly, an
intriguing element that could be added to the church witness project is
the
evidence of Bible prophecy, predicting that the Messiah would institute
a
world-wide church destined to survive and grow despite all obstacles. Significantly, Aquinas regarded the
continuance of the church as "the greatest of miracles,"
all the more
remarkable because "God foretold by many oracles of His prophets
that He
intended to do this."[xx]
Likewise,
the Bible narrative and Bible prophecy projects are synergistic. Bible narrative supports the precious
understanding that our greatest good and flourishing necessarily
includes a
loving relationship with God, but such a claim is pointless to anyone
who
doubts that God exists.
Accordingly, future developments of the project on Bible
narrative would
do well to make prominent what the Bible narrative itself repeatedly
makes
extremely prominent, the evidence of fulfilled prophecy.
On the other hand, the evidence from
prophecy is much more meaningful when considered not in isolation, but
rather
in the rich and lively context provided by the Biblical narrative that
is
proclaimed through the church's witness.
Polkinghorne's
project on Trinitarian metaphysics is also synergistic with Bible
prophecy. A major theme in his
paper is that nature exhibits "top-down effects of a
pattern-forming causality"
that he terms "active information."
For instance, "While life only appeared when the universe
was 11 billion
years old, and self-conscious life when it was 15 billion years old,
there is a
real sense in which the universe was pregnant with carbon-based life
from the
very beginning, its physical fabric being of the precise kind that
alone would
allow this possibility to come about."
Physical constants are finely tuned; there was a planning ahead. There was a knowing from the beginning
of the eventual intended outcome, at least in some crucial aspects,
though
Polkinghorne is balanced in also insisting on real freedom and choice
within
the creation. This view of natural
history has striking resonance with Bible prophecy's picture of
human
history. Both reveal a God who is
transcendent above creation and also immanent within creation; a God
who knows
the end from the beginning; a God who truly is the Alpha and the Omega. However, Bible prophecy constitutes a
testable miracle embedded in the Book of Scripture, which is inherently
richer
in worldview import than even the best reading of the Book of Nature.
The
most strategic synergy is that between Bible prophecy and other Bible
miracles. Christian revealed theology is
based on
the Bible, a book full of miracles from the creation out of nothing in
Genesis
to the resurrection of Christ in the Gospels to the return of Christ in
Revelation. But are these miracles
an asset or a liability?
Obviously,
the Bible presumes that its reported miracles count as evidence in
favor of its
authority and truth. Indeed, the
very words used for miracles, "signs and wonders," have
this import of
evidence. The word "signs"
points
from the physical event itself to its
substantial
theological import, and the word "wonders" points
to great
evidential weight. And
transparently, in context, these signs and wonders were regarded as
evidence
for Jews and gentiles from many nations alike, so this evidence counts
across
worldviews, religions, languages, and cultures.
Indeed,
for many contemporary persons, miracle reports elicit the exact
opposite of the
intended reaction, increasing skepticism. "The
most formidable intellectual obstacle to accepting
the historicity
of the biblical documents in their reports of extraordinary events is
of course
the suspicion that the kind of universe depicted in these documents
just does
not exist. ... The
suggestion that the Bible comes
from a nonscientific age in which the universe was viewed as populated
by
strange beings or by people with strange powers is very difficult to
reject for
people reared in a context dominated by science."[xxi] It must also be
observed that many Bible scholars are as
entrenched in their rejection of Bible miracles as are any naturalists.
For
some persons, miracles are "signs and wonders" indeed,
supporting theism;
whereas for others, miracles are unbelievable, showing the
Scripture's
prescientific and gullible mentality.
How can this tension be resolved?
One
strategic move is to prioritize those reported miracles with the
strongest
historical evidence and the greatest theological significance,
principally the
resurrection of Christ. Another
strategic move is to also examine testable miracles.
That is, investigate those Bible prophecies that can be
assessed with empirical and public evidence, as the standards for
natural
theology require. If the case for
the Bible's testable miracles fails, then its reported miracles
merit breezy
dismissal. But if this case
succeeds, then reported miracles merit serious investigation.
That
is, if an inquiry into reported miracles is so dominated by
controversial
presuppositions that all attempts to authenticate the evidence seem
futile, then
switch to testable miracles. If
the testable evidence of Bible prophecy shows miraculous accuracy, then
theism
is established in a manner that counts across worldviews and any
presupposed
impossibility of miracles is undone, thus rendering the case for
reported
miracles more manageable. This
advice is an instance of a general methodological principal, "with all
claims
about particular occurrences which are to be expected on one world-view
but not
on another, it is crucial to take into account the other evidence for
that
world-view."[xxii]
Another
obvious liability of the Christian revelation is simply that many other
religions also offer revelations.
How can a purported revelation be tested and authenticated? And more pointedly, how can such a test
be conducted with public evidence that counts across worldviews?
Swinburne
has already provided a wide-ranging approach for testing revelations.[xxiii] Among these,
prophecy provides a particularly valuable
test. "Any significant
revelation will contain information we are unable to verify. Therefore, truth in what we can verify
will be evidence in favor of the truth of what we cannot.
The best of this sort of evidence will
be content which predicts something only God could know or do. That is, if a purported revelation
contains a prediction that God will intervene in history or nature and
that
prediction subsequently proves true, this will be significant evidence
in favor
of the rest of the content of the purported revelation."[xxiv]
Finally,
some intrinsic challenges of a cumulative case must be recognized. First, a cumulative case generates
tricky issues about sequencing its components and controlling its
presuppositions. For instance,
does the cosmological argument presuppose the success of the
ontological argument,
and does evidence from revealed theology presuppose independent proof
of God's
existence from natural theology?
In a complex case with numerous interacting components, it can
be
difficult to locate the real action.
Second, a diffuse case with numerous individually weak
components
demands from its audience no small resources of leisure, patience, and
interest. Third, one might suspect
that, with a little luck, even a false worldview could produce several
lines of
apparent low-grade support. If so,
a rambling case with several low-grade elements may not be particularly
impressive.
Consequently,
however natural a cumulative case may be for a comprehensive theory, a
good
question should be asked. Might
not a true worldview be expected to have at least one source of
decisive
evidence? That is, might not a
cumulative case include an individual argument that singly is
impressive? A plausible claim that a
worldview has
even just one line of weighty evidence would make such a worldview more
credible, interesting, manageable, and testable.
To
identify just two or three principal kinds of evidence for Christian
natural
theology, a useful exercise is to consider the apostolic defense of the
apostolic message, focusing on the evidence that the apostles took to
be
public. As F.F. Bruce observed, "The
argument from prophecy and the argument from miracle were
regarded by
first-century Christians, as by their successors in the second and many
following centuries, as the strongest evidences for the truth of the
gospel. ...
In the proclamation of the apostles the argument from prophecy
and the
argument from miracle coincided and culminated in the resurrection of
Jesus."[xxv] Similarly,
Habermas also noted that the apostles,
particularly in Acts, deployed a "methodological variety"
to engage diverse
audiences with the evidence of prophecy and miracle, and most of all,
the
resurrection of Jesus.[xxvi] One of natural
theology's greatest benefits could be
crafting a context in which Bible miracles can have their intended
effect of
being signs and wonders that support the Gospel message.
In-principle and Empirical
Verdicts on Miracles
Miracles
are evidentially important for theism because "a miraculous
event ... is the most
conspicuous candidate for constituting possible confirmatory evidence
in
support of Theism."[xxvii] And they are
spiritually important because the principal
tenets of Christianity are none other than a series of miracles,
including the
creation, incarnation, and resurrection.
Consequently, it is essential that the case for miracles be
constructed
correctly and effectively, which includes giving reason and evidence
their
proper roles and emphases.
Regrettably,
natural theology has had a long and troubled contest between
in-principle
reasoning and empirical investigation as the principal determinant of
verdicts
on the reality of miracles.
In-principle verdicts involve logical, mathematical, or
philosophical
reasoning, whereas empirical verdicts require physical evidence from
detailed
historical or scientific investigation.
This section reviews three attempts to give in-principle reasons
the
primacy. But all are
wrongheaded. Instead, empirical
investigation has primacy.[xxviii]
Testimonial
Evidence.
The most famous and influential
objection against reported Bible miracles is from Hume, that testimony
to
miracles cannot possibly overturn their antecedent improbability based
on the
observed uniform course of nature.[xxix] As Earman
observes, Hume's novelty was "to launch an
in-principle attack on the possibility of establishing the credibility
of
religious miracles."[xxx] The immediate
implication is that no detailed examination of
historical or other empirical evidence is necessary or even helpful for
reaching a verdict on miracles, quite contrary to the tenor of the
preceding literature
on miracles. The appeal of
in-principle verdicts, when appropriate, is that they can require less
work and
yet be more conclusive and comprehensive.
Earman
delivers a magisterial case that Hume's attack is an abject
failure. In essence, Hume's
understanding of
probability theory is simplistic and his consideration of multiple
witnesses is
inadequate. Hume's argument has
fallen on exceedingly hard times indeed.[xxxi] So, it is a new
day for evidence based on testimony. A
verdict on reported Bible miracles,
such as Christ's resurrection, must involve detailed, meticulous
examination of
historical evidence.
Dwindling
Probabilities.
Plantinga sees the assertion
of a reported Bible miracle, particularly Christ's resurrection,
as involving a
conjunction of several premises.
Even if each premise is highly probable, sadly probability
theory says
their conjunct suffers from "dwindling probabilities."[xxxii] Somewhat
analogous to Hume's critique, Plantinga's argument
reaches an in-principle verdict that testimonial evidence fails to
support any
exciting conclusions. As before,
this in-principle verdict diverts attention away from any detailed
examination
of historical evidence. However,
several philosophers have shown conclusively that Plantinga's
argument is also
an abject failure.[xxxiii]
It
is instructive to realize that Hume and Plantinga's in-principle
attacks on
miracles fail for fundamentally the same reason. As
Earman insists so clearly, in order to determine a
contingent fact about the world, such as whether miracles occur, one
has to
look at the world and see what happens.[xxxiv] This
constitutes an in-principle rejection of in-principle
arguments either for or against miracles.
Scientific
Naturalism.
Many persons with a scientific outlook
believe that science explains everything (or at least could do so,
given
sufficient time and development), so they believe in naturalism, that
the
physical world is the whole of reality.[xxxv] The perception
that science is based on public evidence,
whereas religion is based on private faith, creates an in-principle
expectation
that religion has no evidence worth examining. However,
as a brief reply, two questions might be asked.
First,
what about natural theology's empirical and public evidence,
available to
anyone here and now? Surely, this
kind of evidence commands serious consideration from a genuinely
scientific
mentality.
Second,
exactly what is this "everything" that has an ordinary,
physical
explanation? Most pointedly, is
this "everything" a history of the world that includes or
excludes Christ's
resurrection? If Christ truly was
resurrected after being dead for three days, that momentous event is
surely
outside the realm of natural explanation and instead requires a
supernatural
explanation. Hence, regardless
whether science explains much, if the historical evidence for
Christ's
resurrection is strong, then naturalism is discredited.
Naturalistic
presuppositions do not erase the relevance or value of a natural
theologian
putting Christ's resurrection on the agenda for discussion. Indeed, that is good leadership.
Paul's audience in Athens included
Epicurean and Stoic philosophers, who were sophisticated naturalists,
but still
the topic that Paul pressed most vigorously was Christ's
resurrection.[xxxvi] Similarly, a
recent exchange has been reported in Scientific
American
between Simon Conway Morris (an evolutionary paleontologist identified
as a
Christian) and Richard Dawkins (a biologist identified as "an
agnostic leaning
toward atheism").[xxxvii] Conway Morris
"asserted that the resurrection and other
miracles attributed to Christ were 'historically
verifiable'."
In
review, these three examples reinforce one lesson.
Natural theology's prospects will be brighter if there is
a
thorough transition from in-principle philosophical arguments to
detailed
empirical investigations. To know
about the world, look at it.[xxxviii]
Open Questions
This
paper documents the recent emergence of a bolder paradigm for natural
theology. Such rapid and dramatic
change raises many open questions.
Three are especially important.
First,
is there a negative correlation between an argument's
ambitiousness and
persuasiveness, or not? More
specifically, is revealed theology's ambitious conclusion that "God
communicates" harder to defend than natural theology's
smaller claim that "God
exists" -- particularly since communicating entails existing,
but not the
reverse?
On
the one hand, a negative correlation is the common perception. Menssen and Sullivan document this
standard view, which they summarize by the presupposition:
"One cannot obtain a convincing
philosophical case for a revelatory claim without first obtaining a
highly
plausible case for a good God."[xxxix] That is,
necessarily, natural theology prepares the way for
revealed theology (as exemplified previously by Swinburne's
natural theology
being "crucially relevant" in his historical case for
Christ's
resurrection). And they
acknowledge that "if one is trying to answer a complex
question," such as
whether God exists and
communicates, then logical considerations seem to say that "one
must first
answer any embedded simpler questions."
Obviously, were these valid considerations, then an ambitious
revelatory
claim is arduous because it requires all of the work of a successful
natural
theology plus the additional evidence for the revelatory claim itself. More generally, one might worry about
Earman's dictum that "In philosophy, ... almost all
ambitious projects are
failures."[xl]
On
the other hand, Menssen and Sullivan argue that the standard view does
not survive
scrutiny. Two of their concerns
are that "even if an agnostic can assign a fairly high
probability to the claim
that there is a good God, that is a long way from endorsing a
particular
revelatory claim" and "a bit of reflection shows that for
any complex question there
is
always at least one sub-question that cannot be answered before the
complex
question is answered, because there is no such thing as
presuppositionless
inquiry." Despair about the
standard
approach leads to a pivotal question: "an
agnostic inquirer might well wonder whether a
nonbeliever could find
a philosophical case for accepting at once both the claim that God exists and the claim
that God has revealed." That is,
might the negative correlation be broken, with at least some arguments
for
Christian theism being as strong as even the best arguments for generic
theism? They argue that such is
the case. They also argue for the
even stronger thesis that "a negative conclusion about the
existence of God is
unwarranted unless the content of revelatory claims has been
considered."
So,
which of these two opinions is correct?
Is Christian theism much harder than generic theism for natural
theology
to defend with its public evidence, or not? This
is a vital question for the community of natural
theologians. All that I can
express is one person's opinion, that "almost all"
are the key words in the
above Earman quotation. Indeed, I
take finding those few ambitious projects that deliver big conclusions
from
modest work to be the hallmark of creativity and productivity in
natural
theology.
Second,
how can one assess the evidential strength of a twice-told story --
of an event
prophesied in the Old Testament and chronicled in the New Testament,
such as
Christ's resurrection? It is
already abundantly clear that single and multiple witnesses to a
reported
miracle are hugely different cases.[xli] But what about
an event foretold by prophets hundreds of
years in advance and subsequently reported by eyewitnesses? This scenario is claimed in the New
Testament repeatedly.[xlii] My intuition is
that having testimony that is partly
miraculous and partly ordinary transcends the present analysis of
multiple
witnesses. But how to assess a
twice-told story's evidential strength and worldview import
appears to be an
open question.
Furthermore,
Christ's resurrection might better be described as a thrice-told
story because
numerous recent witnesses also report that Christ is alive, as
documented by
Wiebe.[xliii] Hence, there
are witnesses to Christ's resurrection located
in time in that event's past, present, and future.
This is quite a spectacular cloud of witnesses!
Indeed,
witnesses spanning time are exactly what is to be expected on the basis
of
Christ's own claims that he himself spans all time.
"I am the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last,
the
Beginning and the End" (Revelation 22:13). "Before
Abraham was born, I AM" (John 8:58). "And
surely I will be with you always,
to the very end of the age" (Matthew 28:20).
Third
and finally, how do recent developments change the relationship between
natural
theology and revealed theology?
This relationship has already been worked out for traditional
natural
theology, primarily by showing that the Old and New Testaments contain
a
substantial natural theology that can help to prepare the way for
revealed
theology.[xliv] But what about
the newer, bolder natural theology that
itself provides evidential support for several key Christian tenets,
such as
God's foreknowledge of, and involvement in, human history and
Christ's
resurrection from the dead?
How
best to reformulate this changed relationship is an open question
beyond this
paper's ambitions. However, a
brief comment may be offered.
Christian revealed theology is inherently a package deal -- a
combination
of beliefs and attitudes and practices -- as is evident from texts
such as the
Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount, the Lord's Prayer,
the Nicene Creed,
and ultimately the entire Bible.
Clearly, even Christian natural theology's enriched
content is still considerably
less than the whole package deal of Christian orthodoxy.[xlv] But
significantly, based on well-attested facts, Habermas
presents a "resurrection theology that moves from this event to
several other
key Christian beliefs" along multiple paths "including
historical,
philosophical, counseling, and experiential" paths.[xlvi] Because a
little truth can lead to much truth, a bold
natural theology supporting key Christian tenets can be a good start.
Implications for
Apologetics
Natural
theology and Christian apologetics overlap somewhat, especially when
natural
theology delivers a distinctively and substantially Christian theology,
rather
than merely a minimal or generic theology. Consequently,
prevalent approaches and attitudes in
apologetics can influence objectives and expectations in natural
theology. Likewise, accomplishments in
natural
theology can influence ambitions in Christian apologetics.
Recent
trends have favored a "modest" or "humble"
apologetics, such as the 2006 book
by James Taylor.[xlvii] The evidence
for Christianity is deemed respectable and yet
rather ambiguous and unconvincing, at least for many or even most
persons. Accordingly, Christian belief and
commitment are attributed primarily to personal experience of God and
the
working of the Holy Spirit. Only
modest claims are expressed for evidence and argument.
However,
humble apologetics is not apostolic apologetics. It
is a contrivance, outside the apostolic tradition.
The apostles voiced a confident
apologetics. The facts about what they
heard and saw and touched -- including prophecy and miracle and
preeminently the
resurrection -- led them to a personal certainty about the truth of
the Gospel
message. Furthermore, based on
their honest and reliable reports, they commended this same certainty
to their
readers. To be confident of the
truth works with -- not against -- personal experience of God,
the witness of the
Holy Spirit, Christian commitment, and a kind and respectful attitude
toward non-believers.
What
are the A, B, Cs of apologetics?
Christian apologetics should be apostolic -- not contrived;
bold, not
minimal; and confident, not modest.
The chief function of an apostolic, bold, confident apologetics
is the
defense of the Gospel message, proclaimed in Scripture, as truly being
a Word
or revelation from God. The task
of natural theology is to reach the most significant truths available
to
unaided reason evaluating public evidence, in contrast to the greater
truths
available only to faith through a genuine revelation from God. Reason's greatest challenge and
offering is to discern which claimed revelation is truly from God so
that
reason and faith can flourish together.
Scripture exemplifies precisely this objective, using the
evidence of
prophecy and miracle to support the claims that Christ is God and that
the
apostolic witness constitutes a real revelation from God.
The apostolic defense of the apostolic
message is the best model for Christian apologetics, across the nations
and over
the centuries.
Conclusions
Several
recent projects in natural theology use public evidence to support
Christian
theism.[xlviii] It will be
surprising if every project that is ever proposed
stands the test of time. But it
will also be surprising if all fail.
If even just a few succeed, and especially if they are
integrated in a
powerful synergistic case, then natural theology's new support
for
distinctively Christian theism will be firmly established.
To prioritize, develop, assess, and
integrate various projects and synergies will take many scholars many
years. But what just a few
scholars have produced in just a few years shows some promise.
Natural
science delivers knowledge, having substantial theoretical and
practical value,
by means of empirical and public evidence. Natural
theology, in its bold contemporary paradigm,
delivers the same. What can be
discovered and known by looking at the world? The
answer to that significant question emerges from a winning
combination of empirical disciplines that includes both natural science
and
natural theology.
The most pressing motivation for
developing an enriched natural theology is to provide better support
for
Christian revealed theology.
Natural theology is important because revealed theology is
really,
really, really important. Aquinas
explained that we need God's self-disclosure because "The
human being is
designed by God for a final purpose of a sort that is beyond
reason's power,"
for according to Isaiah 64:4, "without you, O God, no eye has
seen what you
have prepared for those who love you."[xlix] And Swinburne
said that "People are very different from each
other, and they come to a belief that the Nicene Creed is true by many
different routes; but some form of natural theology is, I suggest,
quite important
for quite a lot of inhabitants of the modern world."[l] A clearer
definition and broader conception of natural
theology, respecting empirical and public evidence wherever found, mean
more
evidence and richer conclusions.[li]
Notes
[i] Richard
Swinburne, "Natural Theology, its 'Dwindling
Probabilities' and 'Lack of Rapport'," Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004): 533-546.
This article appears in a special issue
on "The Continuing Relevance of Natural Theology."
[ii] Robert
Audi (Editor), The Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy,
Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), 911.
[iii] Simon
Blackburn (Editor), The
Oxford Dictionary of
Philosophy, Second Edition
(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 247.
[iv] Edward
Craig (Editor), Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(New York: Routledge, 1998), 6:707-713.
[v] McGrath
identifies a particularly important debate as
being "whether Christian theology offers an account of its own
privileged
insights, or whether it can be seen as engaging with publicly
accessible resources,"
and he regards "Natural theology as discourse in the public
arena." Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology:
Volume 1, Nature (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 300.
Trigg expresses this issue of public evidence in very concrete
language. "Does the belief that
there is a God have the same logical status as, say, the belief that
there are
elephants in Africa?" Roger Trigg,
Reason and Commitment
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1973), 27.
[vi] Likewise,
standard dictionaries reiterate the
traditional definition of natural theology. For
example, the Oxford English
Dictionary (Second Edition,
1989)
defines natural theology as "theology based upon reasoning from
natural facts
apart from revelation," and similarly the Mirriam-Webster
Dictionary (Tenth Edition,
1999) says "theology deriving its knowledge of God from the study of
nature
independent of
special revelation" (visit www.oed.com and www.m-w.com).
[vii] Victor
Reppert, "Several Formulations of the Argument
from Reason," Philosophia
Christi 5
(2003): 9-33. This argument's
premises concern the universe's existence, the principle of
sufficient reason,
and such. Necessarily, no more
comes out from the argument's conclusion than what goes into its
premises. Also see Stephen T. Davis, "The
Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status of Belief in
God," Philosophia
Christi 1
(1999): 5-15.
[viii] Richard
Swinburne, The Existence of
God (Oxford: Oxford
University
Press, 1979), 8.
[ix] Stanley
Hauerwas, With the Grain of
the Universe: The Church's Witness
and Natural
Theology, Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of St.
Andrews
in 2001
(Grand Rapids: Brazos Press,
2001), 15-16.
[x] Hugh
G. Gauch, Jr., John A. Bloom, and Robert C.
Newman, "Public Theology and Scientific Method:
Formulating Reasons that Count Across Worldviews," Philosophia
Christi 4 (2002):
45-88. I read a precursor of that
paper, "Method in Public Theology," at the Gifford
conference in May 2000 at
Aberdeen. Subsequently, a sequel
has appeared: Robert C. Newman,
John A. Bloom, and Hugh G. Gauch, Jr., "Public Theology and
Prophecy Data: Factual Evidence that
Counts for the
Biblical World View," Journal of the
Evangelical Theological Society
46 (2003): 79-110. These two published
papers are
available by visiting www.ibri.org.
Also, requests may be sent to Hugh Gauch at hgg1@cornell.edu to
receive
pdf files of these two papers by e-mail attachment.
Negative and positive views of the evidence of Bible
prophecy have been expressed by Evan Fales and Robert Newman,
respectively, in Philosophia
Christi 3
(2001): 22-26 and 63-67.
[xi] John
Polkinghorne, "Physics and Metaphysics in a
Trinitarian Perspective," Theology
and Science 1 (2003):
33-49. Also see his
Gifford lectures for Edinburgh in 1993-1994. John
Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections
of a Bottom-Up Thinker
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996).
[xii] Richard
Swinburne, The Resurrection
of God Incarnate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
210. This argument also appears in
briefer form in his "Evidence for the Resurrection," in
Stephen T. Davis,
Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O'Collins (editors), The
Resurrection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),
191-212. A review of
Swinburne's
book by Stephen T. Davis appears in Philosophia Christi 6 (2005): 169-173 and by
Jerry L. Walls in Faith and Philosophy 22 (2005): 235-238.
[xiii] Swinburne
continues: "St Luke tells us that
in writing his Gospel, he was one of
many who were putting into writing what they had been told by those
who, 'from
the beginning were eyewitnesses and servants of the Word,' and
he was doing so
in order that the recipient of his Gospel, Theophilus, 'may know
the truth
concerning the things about which you have been instructed.' ...
We have historical knowledge and expertise which puts us in a
position
as good as that of the second century to assess the detailed historical
evidence (to be supported by the evidence of natural theology) for the
historical claims of Christianity."
Swinburne, "Natural Theology, its 'Dwindling
Probabilities' and 'Lack of
Rapport'."
[xiv] Gary
R. Habermas, The Risen Jesus
& Future Hope (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Gary
R. Habermas and Michael R. Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of
Jesus (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004); N.T. Wright, The
Resurrection of the Son of God
(Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2003); and Robert B. Stewart, editor, The
Resurrection of Jesus: John
Dominic Crossan and N.T. Wright in Dialogue (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 2006).
A review of Habermas's book by Richard Brian Davis
appears in Philosophia
Christi 7
(2005): 231-234 and a review of Wright's book by William
Lane Craig in Faith
and Philosophy 22 (2005):
239-245.
Significantly, having analyzed literally thousands of papers on
Christ's
resurrection, Habermas develops a "minimal facts" version
of the resurrection
argument using only those data that even highly critical Bible scholars
tend to
accept.
[xv] For
example, Monti has applied Trinitarian natural
theology to the arts. Anthony
Monti, A
Natural Theology of the Arts:
Imprint of the Spirit
(Burlington:
Ashgate, 2003), including a foreword by John Polkinghorne. For another example, Dubay has produced
a wide-ranging contemplation of the significance of beauty, including a
distinctively Trinitarian perspective.
Thomas Dubay, The Evidential Power of Beauty: Science and
Theology
Meet (San
Francisco: Ignatius, 1999), especially 320-321.
[xvi] Thomas
Aquinas in Raymond Martin and Christopher
Bernard (editors), God
Matters: Readings in
the Philosophy of Religion
(New York: Longman, 2003),
61-63.
[xvii] Geivett
considers a different subset of arguments that
omits some of the five examples reviewed here. But
he sketches a vigorous cumulative case for Christian
theism with eight steps that could readily incorporate additional
elements. R. Douglas Geivett, "David Hume
and a Cumulative Case Argument," in James F.
Sennett and Douglas
Groothuis, editors, In
Defense of Natural Theology:
A Post-Humean Assessment
(Downers Grove:
InterVarsity Press, 2005), 297-329.
[xviii] Wayne
C. Myrvold, "A Bayesian Account of the Virtue of
Unification," Philosophy
of Science 70
(2003): 399-423. Also see Marc
Lange, "Bayesianism and Unification: A Reply to Wayne
Myrvold," Philosophy
of Science 71
(2004): 205-215; Timothy McGrew, "Confirmation, Heuristics,
and Explanatory
Reasoning," The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003): 553-567; and
Tomoji Shogenji, "A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic
Support," The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003): 613-616.
[xix] Swinburne,
The Existence of God, 244-276; William P. Alston, Perceiving
God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991);
Jerome I. Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of
Theistic Belief (Ithaca:
Cornell University
Press, 1997); and Martin and Bernard, God Matters, 341-386.
[xx] Thomas
Aquinas in Martin and Bernard, God
Matters, 257.
Regarding the threats to the church
that make its continuance so amazing, Aquinas barely managed to mention
"the
violence of persecutors," instead emphasizing the small
mindedness and self
centeredness, found in everyone, that strongly oppose Christ's
message and
call.
[xxi] Phillip
Wiebe, "Authenticating Biblical Reports of
Miracles," in Robert A. Larmer (editor), Questions of Miracle (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1996),
101-120; a response follows by Robert A. Larmer, "Miracles
and Testimony: A Reply to Wiebe,"
121-131. Also see Raymond Martin,
"Historians on
Miracles," in Martin and Bernard, God Matters, 412-427. Some
scientists attempt to provide a
purely naturalistic explanation for belief in religion and the
supernatural. See Jesse M. Bering, "The
Cognitive Psychology of Belief in the Supernatural,"
American Scientist 94
(2006): 142-149 and George
Johnson, "Getting a Rational Grip on Religion," Scientific
American 294 (1; 2006):
94-95.
[xxii] Richard
Swinburne, Revelation:
From Metaphor to Analogy
(Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 69.
[xxiii] Swinburne,
Revelation.
[xxiv] Kelli S. O'Brien, "Kant and
Swinburne on Revelation," Faith and Philosophy 17 (2000): 535-557,
accurately summarizing Swinburne, Revelation, 88-89. Likewise,
recall Christ's words, "I
have spoken to you of earthly things and you do not believe; how then
will you
believe if I speak of heavenly things?" (John 3:12).
[xxv] F.F.
Bruce, The Apostolic Defence
of the Gospel: Christian Apologetic in the
New Testament (London: Inter-Varsity Press, 1967), 11-12.
[xxvi] Habermas,
The Risen Jesus & Future
Hope, xv.
[xxvii] George
Schlesinger, Religion and
Scientific Method (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1997), 193.
[xxviii] Any
argument reaching a conclusion about the world
requires premises or inputs of three kinds: presuppositions,
evidence, and logic (or reasoning). The
evidence has primacy for discerning
which hypothesis to assert as the conclusion. Hugh
G. Gauch, Jr., Scientific
Method in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
40-72 and 112-155, but especially 124-131 (and Chinese
edition, Beijing: Tsinghua University
Press, 2004).
[xxix] David
Hume, "Of Miracles," reproduced in John Earman, Hume's Abject Failure: The
Argument Against Miracles
(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 140-157. In his
concluding paragraph, Hume claimed that "What we have said of
miracles may be
applied, without any variation, to prophecies."
But again, some Bible prophecies can be tested by empirical
and public evidence available for inspection here and now, with no
reliance on
testimony whatsoever, so these prophecies are wholly immune to
Hume's (dubious)
critique of testimonial evidence.
[xxx] Earman,
Hume's Abject Failure, 5.
[xxxi] For
instance, Earman judges that proper examination "reveals Hume's
seemingly powerful argument to be a
shambles from which little
emerges intact, save for posturing and pompous solemnities." John Earman, "Bayes, Hume, Price, and
Miracles," in Richard Swinburne (editor), Bayes's Theorem (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 91-109.
Also see John Earman, "Bayes, Hume, and Miracles,"
Faith
and Philosophy 10 (1993):
293-310; Earman, Hume's Abject Failure and the reviews by Jeffrey
Koperski in Philosophia Christi 4 (2002): 558-563 and by Robert Sloan
Lee in Faith
and Philosophy 20 (2003):
379-382; Joseph Houston, Reported Miracles: A Critique of
Hume
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Robert A. Larmer, "David
Hume
and the Miraculous," in Larmer, Questions of Miracle, 26-39; Rodney D. Holder, "Hume on Miracles:
Bayesian Interpretation, Multiple Testimony,
and the
Existence of God," The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 49 (1998): 49-65;
Charles
Taliaferro and Anders Hendrickson, "Hume's Racism and His
Case against the
Miraculous," Philosophia Christi 4 (2002): 427-441; Hendrik van der
Breggen, "Hume's
Scale: How Hume Counts a Miracle's Improbability Twice," Philosophia
Christi 4 (2002):
443-453; and Shogenji, "A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic
Support." In his recent A Defense of
Hume on
Miracles
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2003), Robert J. Fogelin attempts to revive Hume's
argument. But see the critical book review
by
Timothy McGrew in Mind
114 (2005): 145-149.
[xxxii] Alvin
Plantinga, Warranted
Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000),
272-280.
[xxxiii] Jason
Colwell, "The Historical Argument for the
Christian Faith: A Response to
Alvin Plantinga," International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2003): 147-161; Timothy
McGrew, "Has Plantinga Refuted the Historical Argument?,"
Philosophia
Christi 6
(2004): 7-26; and Swinburne, "Natural
Theology, its 'Dwindling Probabilities'
and 'Lack of Rapport'."
[xxxiv] Earman,
Hume's Abject Failure, 4.
[xxxv] McGrath
critiques the often too quick and unjustified
slide from evolutionary biology to atheistic philosophy.
Alister McGrath, Dawkins'
God: Genes, Memes and the Meaning of Life (Oxford: Blackwell,
2004). And Larmer is concerned that even
some
theists view nature and science in a manner that undermines the
rationality of
belief in God. Robert Larmer, "Theistic
Complementarianism and Ockham's Razor," Philosophia
Christi 7 (2005): 503-514.
[xxxvi] J.
Daryl Charles, "Paul Before the Areopagus: Reflections
on the Apostle's Encounter
with Cultured Paganism," Philosophia
Christi 7 (2005): 125-140. Also see
Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, 21-38.
[xxxvii] John
Horgan, "Clash in Cambridge," Scientific
American 293 (3, 2005): 24B-28. Conway
Morris emphasizes the importance of
developing a
metaphysic or theology of evolution.
Simon Conway Morris, Life's Solution:
Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003),
especially 311-330. Conway Morris
is to deliver the Gifford lectures at Edinburgh in 2007.
[xxxviii] Incidentally,
yet another challenge that can divert
attention away from theology's evidence is that the Christian
worldview and
lifestyle can seem unappealing or even morally repugnant to an outsider. But worldviews can feel very different
from the outside and the inside.
Hence, what philosophy - the love of wisdom - would
enjoin is first to
determine which worldview is true, and then to see if one can manage to
like it
as an insider. Conceivably,
evidence leads to truth and truth leads to
happiness. Terence D.Cuneo, "Combating the
Noetic Effects of Sin:
Pascal's Strategy for Natural Theology," Faith
and Philosophy 11 (1994):
645-662; Swinburne, "Natural
Theology, its 'Dwindling Probabilities' and 'Lack of
Rapport'"; William T. Wood, "Reason's
Rapport: Pascalian Reflections on
the Persuasiveness of Natural Theology," Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004): 519-532; and Paul
K. Moser, "Jesus and Philosophy:
On the Questions We Ask," Faith and Philosophy 22 (2005): 261-283.
[xxxix] Sandra
Menssen and Thomas D. Sullivan, "The Existence
of God and the Existence of Homer:
Rethinking Theism and Revelatory Claims," Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002): 331-347.
[xl] Earman,
Hume's Abject Failure, 3.
[xli] Earman,
Hume's Abject Failure, 53-59.
[xlii] For
instance, the exceptional synergistic strength of
prophecies plus eyewitnesses is emphasized in 2 Peter 1:16-21.
[xliii] Phillip
Wiebe, Visions of Jesus (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997).
[xliv] See
the Gifford lectures by Farmer in 1950 at Glasgow,
Raven in 1951-1952 at Edinburgh, and Barr in 1991 at Edinburgh. Herbert H. Farmer, Revelation and Religion (Lewiston: Edwin
Mellen Press, 1999); Charles E.
Raven, Natural Religion and Christian Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1953, two
volumes); and James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1993).
[xlv] By
Christian orthodoxy is meant the central Christian
convictions, such as those famously called Mere Christianity by C.S. Lewis (New York:
HarperCollins, 2001). Packer and
Oden present a more recent
formulation. J.I. Packer and
Thomas C. Oden, One Faith: The
Evangelical Consensus
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity
Press, 2004). None of the projects
reviewed here, and more generally none of the arguments that might be
anticipated in Christian natural theology, adjucate doctrinal
differences
between Christian denominations.
[xlvi] Habermas,
The Risen Jesus & Future
Hope, vii.
[xlvii] James
E. Taylor, Introducing
Apologetics: Cultivating Christian
Commitment (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006). Also
see John G. Stackhouse, Jr., Humble Apologetics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
[xlviii] This
paper on natural theology necessarily concerns
public evidence. It must at least
be mentioned, however, that Christianity also offers personal evidence. Christ claimed that "If any one chooses
to do God's will, he will find out whether my teaching comes
from God or
whether I speak on my own" (John 7:17).
This test costs one's life, but is promised to deliver
personal
conviction and eternal benefit. By
contrast, evaluating natural theology's evidence is a cheap
test, requiring no
more time and effort that that unhesitatingly given to planning a
family vacation,
yet it can deliver useful preliminary worldview insight.
These cheap or costly tests, involving
public or personal evidence, are complementary in their intellectual
and
spiritual roles.
[xlix] Norman
Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of
Theism: Aquinas's Natural
Theology in Summa contra gentiles I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 34;
also see
Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas's
Natural Theology in
Summa contra gentiles II
(Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), 11-12.
[l] Swinburne,
"Natural Theology, its 'Dwindling Probabilities'
and 'Lack of Rapport'."
[li] An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the
meeting of the Canadian Society of Christian Philosophers in May 2004
at
Winnipeg by Robert Larmer in my absence and the formal response was
given by
Phillip Wiebe. I appreciate
helpful suggestions from John Bloom, Gary Habermas, Robert Larmer,
Robert
Newman, and also from Dale Pleticha who is the editor for IBRI research
reports. With much love and
fondness, I dedicate this paper to my Godson, Jonathan Xavier, and his
brothers, Joseph Anthony and Joshua Robert.